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In The S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
VERL FARNSWORTH,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
11126

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Verl Farnsworth, was convicted
by a jury of second degree murder before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced as provided by law for the crime of murder
in the second degree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State asks this Court to affirm the judgment

of the lower court on the basis that no reversible

errors were committed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Brief of Appellant sets out the facts quite
fairly. Any disagreement that the State has will be
pointed out in the arguments that follow.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTION CORRECTLY IMPEACHED
THE DEFENDANT WITH HIS OWN PRIOR VOLUNTEERED STATEMENTS.

In the case at bar Ralph Whittaker ,a police officer with twelve years experience, was assigned to
a radio patrol car on the day of the murder (TR. 89).
He was flagged down by a lady waving her arms.
This lady reported a man with a gun had either shot
or was planning to shoot his son.
Officer Whittaker proceeded to the scene of the
shooting, made a quick examination and investigation, then placed the defendant under arrest. While
defendant was in the police car havjng handcuffs
placed on him, he made some statements (TR. 98).
The defendant informed the police officer that there
was no need for handcuffs because he wasn't going
to hurt anybody. The defendant also commented
that he had shot his son and wasn't sorry, but hoped
the boy wouldn't die (TR. 99).
Officer Whittaker then began transporting the
defendant to the Salt Lake City Police Station. As
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they started towards the Police Station the defendant
seemed very willing to talk (TR. 194). Because of this
apparent willingness to talk, Officer Whittu.ker
stopped the car and asked Officer Frisbey to witness the Miranda warning. At this time Officer Whittaker told the defendant that he had a right to remain silent and asked the defendant if he understood this right. The defendant said he did. Then
the defendant was told that anything he said could
and would be used against him in court. The police
officer again asked the defendant if he understood
and again the defendant answered that he did understand. The defendant was then told of his right
to have a lawyer with him while he was questioned
and again the defendant stated he understood. Officer Whittaker then informed the defendant that if
he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed before any questioning, and again the defendant indicated his understanding of what was
told him.
Even after this careful warning given by an experienced policeman, the defendant again started
to talk about the circumstances of the incident. The
police officer then asked the defendant if by talking he was waiving his rights to an attorney and the
defendant stated: "I guess I ought to talk to a lawyer
before I make a formal statement, but l'll tell you what
happened." (Emphasis added.) (TR. 193). After the defendant made this statement the policeman did not
interrogate nor ask questions about this matter. The
officer's testimony was as follows: "Well, he was
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disposed to talk and I just listened to what he had to
say." (TR. 194).
After Officer Whittaker and the defendant arrived at the police station, custody of the defendant
was given to Leonard Elton, a detective in the Detective Bureau. Detective Elton took the defendant
into the Interrogation Ro0in in the Salt Lake County
Jail and read the Miranda card to him. Defendant was
then asked what happened and he started to tell
them. A tape recording was taken (TR. 200). The defendant did not ask for an attorney to be with him
(TR. 200), nor did he tell the police that he wished
to remain silent until an attorney was present (TR.
202).
The statements on this tape were later used to
impeach the defendant's testimony (TR. 222).

A
STATEMENTS FREELY GIVEN DO NOT VIOLATE MIRANDA V. ARJZONA.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d
694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the Supreme Court of the
United States excluded all volunteered statements
from its holding:
"Volunteered statements of any kind are
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their
admissibility is not affected by our holding today." 384 U.S. at 473, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.

Many jurisdictions hold that the question is real-
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ly whether or not the statement given was solicited
by the police. In State v. Law, 203 Kan. 89, 452 P.2d
862 (1969), the Supreme Court of Kansas dealt with
a case wherein the police officer advised the defendan t of his rights and the defendant stated: "If
I knew that you was going to pick me up this quick
I would have had a gun." Id. 452 P.2d at 864. Tho
court held that this statement was admissible, and
stated:
"The defendant's voluntary exclamation
in connection with his arrest may not be said,
in our judgment, to have been elicited by
police officers either through solicitation or by
means of investigatory questioning." Id. at 865

A somewhat similar situation faced the Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Savage, 242 N.E.2d 446
(1968). In that case the defendant entered a sheriff's
office and stated that he had murdered his wife.
The deputies then took the defendant to the murder
scene and advised him of his rights. He was then
taken to the sheriff's office, where:
". . . he was fully advised of his rights and
was, in fact, given the name of the Public Defender. At this point, he stated that he wished
to tell his story and to get it off his chest and
made a detailed statement of the occurrence and the events leading up to it. Having
been fully advised of his rights prior to making
this statement, it was proper to admit it into
evidence." Id. at 448, 449.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
also faced this question in Andrews v. State, Okl. ~r.,
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455 P.2d 741 (1969). In this case the defendant was
placed in police custody at the scene of the crime
and he, like the defendant in the case at bar, talked
all the way to the station without being questioned
by the transporing officer. However, in this case
no Miranda warning was· given. The Court of Criminal Appeals then cited the Miranda language which
stated that volunteered statements were not affected
by its holding, and said:
"Under the circumstances of this case, we
can only view the situation as being one in
which the defendant volunteered his statements, as described in that part of the Miranda
opinion just recited." Id. at 744.

The court then held that the testimony of the police
officer was properly admitted.
It would be strange indeed if the court were to
find that had the Salt Lake City Police not given
the Miranda warning, and had not questioned the defendant, but merely listened to him (a person who
seemed quite willing to talk), then the volunteered
statements would be admissible, but since the Sal!
Lake City Police were extra careful with this de- ,
fendant and warned him of his rights, those state·
men ts he made voluntarily after mentioning that he
ought to have an attorney, must be excluded from
evidence.
It was well put by the Trial Judge:
"All right. I am not satisfied at all that his
rights to counsel was misunderstood or that it
was not intelligently waived. Here is a man
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who apparently is anxious to talk to the Police
and tell them what happened even to the point
where the Officer taking him to the Police Department stops in a street and gets another Officer to come over and listen to him give the
warnings.... Now, if the Supreme Court wants
to go that far, why let them tell us about it
again. I think this cloak of protection that we
throw over people that commit crimes will reach
a limit and this case impresses me of being a
good example. Where the Officers go just about
as far as they ought to be required to go, but
the man still tells them what he wants to tell
them, so, I am not satisfied at all that the confession itself if there were a confession or
rather the statement he made to the Officer itself would be admissible if the Prosecution had
attempted to put it in to begin with. In any
event, they get him to the Police Station, they
tell him this same thing and he goes ahead and
talks to them. Now, there is no specific demand
for a Lawyer, no request that a Lawyer be
called or be present. He has been asked certainly by Officer Whittaker at one point if he understands these rights and he said he did and
yet he went ahead and chatted with him while
he was taking him into the Station." (TR. 204,
205).

There is absolutely no valid claim in this case
that the statements of the defendant were not volunteered.
B
MIRANDA SAFEGUARDS CAN STOP INTERROGATION MACHINERY, BUT THE DEFENDANT'S
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CONDUCT OR STATEMENTS CAN START IT
AGAIN.
Even if this Court were to find that the defendant's statement ("I guess I ought to talk to a lawyer
before I make a formal statement, but I'll tell you
what happened") were a request for counsel, the
statements subseque:;-:tly made should still be ad·
missible.
Under Miranda the interrogation machinery must
completely stop once the person requests the pres·
ence of an attorney. This shut-down of the intemr
gation process, however, is certainly not final.
Actions or statements by the defendant can give
the police the right to resume questioning. Once a
person has requested counsel but continues to talk,
the police are neither forced to remain quiet nor
forced to stop listening.
A California Court of Appeais was faced with
a situation where a defendant was arrested, given
the Miranda warning, and reqUested a lawyer indicat·
ing his desire to remain silent. After being placed
in jail the defendant asked his jailor if he could talk
with Sergeant Neil. While in the .:nterrogation room
Sergeant Neil again advised the defendant of his
rights, but the defendant proceeded to make a
statement which was taped and later used against
him. The attorney for the defendant objected to this
tape recording claiming that when the defendant
asserted his rights he became permanently insulat·
ed from subsequent interrogation and this precluded
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the use of any elicited statements. The Court of Appeals then commendably made the following observation of the correct rule:
"We disagree with defendant's contention
that an original invocation of rights requires
permanent application of the no-interrogation
rule regardless of any intervening act by the
defendant. The rule explicitly affords insulation, not from an interrogation conducted
after a defendant has himself changed his mind,
but instead from an interrogation conducted
in order to change his mind.
* * *
We hold, therefore, that after defendant volunteered to make a statement the police were
entitled to interrogate him to the same extent
as if he had initially so volunteered without having invoked his rights." People v. Sunday, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 752 at 757 (1969).

The only difference between the People v. Sunday
case and the case at bar is the fact that the defendant in Sunday was left in his cell alone for awhile. The
rule set out by the court, however, is a good one.
The only question that an appellate court should
concern itself with is whether or not the defendant
himself has changed his mind.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has also recently faced this problem. In that case the defendant
was taken into custody and had been given his
rights. He requested an attorney before making a
statement. At that time the officer giving the defendant his rights read aloud the ballistics report on
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a rifle and bullet. At that time the defendant confessed to the crime. Later, on the stand, he stated
that he had made no statement that would incriminate him in the murder. The prosecution sought to
show that he had orally confessed to the murder.
The Court saw the issue as whether or not the defendant' s confession was voluntary or coerced in
violation of defendant's wishes to remain silent until
he had the advice of counsel. The Court then correctly stated:
"We hold that the evidence justified the
trial court in finding that the appellant, after
he had been effectively warned of his constitutional rights, had voluntarily waived these
rights after being informed that the ballistics
report showed the bullet taken from the head
of Mrs. Haden had been fired from the rifle that
appellant was known to have sold shortly after
Mrs. Haden's body was found. Appellant, himself, does not claim the police resorted to unlawful methods to coerce him to implicate himself in the crime. Appellant's own testimony
was that he did not make any statement to
Sergeant Babbs or to anyone else that would
incriminate him in the murder.
Under the facts and circumstances presented by this record we find that the trial
court correctly admitted the alleged confession
in evidence and therefore conclude that appellant was given a fair trial." Combs v. Common·
wealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 at 85 (Ky. Ct. App.
1969).

It is readily seen that in this case the defendant
was at all times in the presence of policemen as was
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the defendant at bar. The questions and answers
between the officer and defendant in Combs were
allowed in evidence and they should also be allowed in the case at bar.
In Bazzell v. State, 6 Md. App. 194, 250 A.2d 674
(1969), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
also faced the situation where one, advised of his
rights, requested not to be interrogated and yet still
confessed. In Bazzell the defendant was placed in
jail and when an officer took lunch to the defendant,
the defendant admitted breaking into two places.
This admission was offered at trial and the trial judge
allowed it. On appeal the Court said:
"We find, therefore, that the statement
here given was not the product of police interrogation but was freely and voluntarily given.
Under the circumstances, its admission was
not in violation of any of the mandates of
Miranda, supra." Id. 250 A.2d at 677.

It is clearly evident that Miranda safeguards can
stop the interrogation process, but when the defendant is disposed to talk and does in fact talk,
the police are not required to listen with deaf ears
and remain completely silent. Therefore when Officer Whittaker gave the defendant his Miranda warning and the defendant continued to talk, his volunteered statements could and should be used against
him. He had stated that he understood his rights,
therefore his actions and statements should constitute a waiver.
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c
STATEMENTS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF
MIRANDA MAY STILL BE USED TO IMPEACH A
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY.
At this point several things should be pointed
out to the court. First, the statements used by the
prosecuion were not offered by the State except to
challenge the credibility of the defendant. Second,
the statements used by the prosecution were volun·
tary, no claim to the contrary having been made.
The language in the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States is designed to
protect a person from being compelled "to be a wit·
ness against himself .... " This is not a privilege "to
lie with impunity once he [the defendant] elects
to take the stand to testify." State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St.
2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969).
Note the following language by Justice Frankfurter from Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct.
354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), which deals with inadmis·
sible evidence under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule:
"It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another
to say that the defendant can tum the illegal
method by which evidence in the Government's
possession was obtained to his own advantage,
and provide himself with a shield against con-
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tradiction of his untruths." Id. 347 U.S. at 65,
74 S. Ct. at 356.

In the case at bar the defendant made certain
statements to the police who recorded these statements. Later on the stand the defendant affirmatively claimed no such statements were made. A Miranda
flaw should not give the defendant a shield to hide
behind.
Counsel for the defendant cites Miranda as authority that statements taken in violation thereof cannot be used to impeach the defendant's testimony.
However, notice the carefully prepared opinion ot
the Supreme Court of Ohio which has recently dealt
with this problem. In that case the defendant was
tried without a jury and the court held that the
prosecution could use statements of an accused
made to police without Miranda warnings, to impeach
accused's credibility. The court then looked at
Miranda as follows:
"We do not believe that the case of

Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.

Ct. 1602, dictates a conclusion contrary to
ours. In Miranda, the court indicated that
statements of a defendant used to impeach his
testimony at trial may not be used unless they
were taken with full warnings and effective
waiver. (384 U.S., at 477, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) However, we note that in all four of the convictions
reversed by that decision statements of the
accused, taken without cautionary warnings,
were used by the prosecution as direct evidence
of guilt in the case in chief.
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"We believe that the words of Chief Justice
Marshall regarding the difference between
holding and dictum are applicable here.
'It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that
general expressions, in every opinion, are to
be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used. If they go beyond
the case, they may be respected, but ought not
to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision.
The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated
with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate
it, are considered in their relation to the case
decided, but their possible hearing on all other
cases is seldom completely investigated.' Cohens
v. Virginia (1821), 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
399, 5 L.Ed. 257.
"The court in Miranda, was not faced with
the facts of this case. Thus, we do not consider
ourselves bound by the dictum of Miranda."
State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d
818 at 821-822 (1969).
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUS
ING TO GIVE AN INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTEE
INSTRUCTION.

Authorities generally agree that where partie:
request jury instructions on lesser offenses, they art
entitled to have instructions given upon their theol'J'
of the case if there is any substantial evidence tc
justify giving such an instruction. State v. Gillian, filec
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January 8, 1970; State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185
P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144
P.2d 290 (1943).
The State recognizes that under State v. Hymas,
64 Utah 285, 230 P. 349 (1924), and State v. Gillian, supra,
that it is a "delicate matter for a trial court to withhold" jury instructions of a lesser included offense,
and the court may only do so in ''clear cases." Our
argument, however, is that the case at bar is a "clear
case.
II

All of the evidence in this case shows that
there was an argument and a killing. This would
lead one to believe there is a question of voluntary
manslaughter. Instructions were given to the jury
not only on voluntary manslaughter, but also on self
defense.
The defendant requested an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Under Utah law manslaughter is an unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. Involuntary manslaughter is defined
as follows:
"Involuntary, in the co.lllIIllllsion of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner or without
due caution and circumspection." Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-30-5 (1953).

The defendant places great weight upon the
recent decision of this Court in State v. Gillian. That
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case is clearly distinguishable. In tha.t case the defendant killed a person who was in the same room
as her common law husband." She did not even
know the person she killed was in the room. (State
of Utah v. Iva Lee Gillian, Brief of Appellant at 5.)
Being angry with her "common law husband" she
fired several shots mto the room intending to scare
him. One shot, however, struck and killed the husband's roommate. As to this set of facts the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
11

"If the jury accepted her version of the
occurrence, that it was in such a state of emotional upset that she got the pistol and fired
it into the room several times intending only
to scare Miller, her offense could be found to
be involuntary manslaughter in that it was a
killing which resulted 'in the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony.' ... "
State v. Gillian, at 3.

In other words, firing a gun merely to scare someone is an unlawful act not amounting to a felony.
In the present case however, the defendant's own
testimony was: "I just figured it was either him or
me and I fired." (TR. 178). This statement goes to the
question of self defense, not the question of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony."
11

Another difference between the Gillian case and
the case at bar is the fact that in Gillian the trial court
refused to give the jury instructions of the lesser
offenses of second degree murder, voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter; thereby lim1ting the
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jury's decision only to two alternatives-guilty of
first degree murder (with or without leniency) and
not guilty.
In the present case the jury was instructed that
they could find the defendant guilty of murder in
the second degree, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty because of self defense. If
the jury were disposed of believing that a lesser
crime had been committed, they would have found
the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of second degree murder.
To find for the defendant, this Court must determine that the defendant was committing a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner or without due caution; or find the defendant's acts constituted an unlawful act not amounting
to a felony.
The evidence in this case simply will not support such a theory. The defendant had his gun before he saw his son with one. The defendant shot
his gun to scare his son, or to force his son out of
the house. Upon seeing his son with a weapon in
hand the defendant shot. This was not by mistake.
The case of State v. Gillian, supra, is not in point.
In that case the facts were such that the court could
determine a theory which would justify an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. In the case at bar,
however, the problem is not one where there is an
accidental killing but under the defendant's own
theory a "square-off."
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This is a "clear case" and the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the evidence
did not warrant an instruction of involuntary man.
slaughter.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT·
TING THE PROSECUTION TO EXAMINE THE DE·
FENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

The Utah Supreme Court set out the test as to
whether or not testimony is admissible in State v.
Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961) as follows:
". . . Where evidence has special relevancy
to prove the crime of which the defendant
stands charged, it may be allowed for that purpose; and the fact that it shows another crime
will not render the evidence inadmissible." Id.
at 12, 361 P.2d at 415.

In the case at bar the defendant took the stand
and testified as to fights and other physical contact
he had had with his son two years before the killing (TR. 172). He also testified that as a rule his gun
was loaded (TR. 180).
This testimnoy was used by the defendant to
show that he was frightened by his son, and went
to the issue of self defense. The defendant was the
only person who actually knew what his own state
of mind was, but there is a strong influence of sell
interest, in statements like this. The following is
found in Wigmore on Evidence:
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"Testimony to one's own intention, or other
state of mind, has often been attacked on the
ground of what is really a disqualification by
Interest; i.e. the argument is that, since a person's own intention can be known only to himself, his statement of what it is or was cannot
be safeguarded by the possibility of exposing
its falsity, through the aid either of conflicting
circumstances or of opposing eye-witnesses; and
that thus the influence of self interest in falsifying is too dangerous, and that such testimony
should consequently be forbidden. This argument has been generally repudiated." Id. State
of Mind § 1965 at 104.

On a theory of self-defense, the prosecution has
the right to question facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's st ate of mind. State v.
Gillian, supra, is not in point. In that case the court
pointed out that there was no indication that there
was pre-existing animosity or "bad blood" between
defendant and her "husband."
In the case at bar, however, the defendant
stated that he carried a loaded gun. Upon cross-examination the defendant was asked if he had
threatened others with his loaded gun. This question was asked for the purpose of showing his state
of mind (TR. 183). The defendant was then asked
whether or not he had threatened dogs or cats
and he replied that he had several months prior.
This question was not objected to by defense counsel. The defendant then admitted threatening to
shoot his oldest daughter and also getting out a
deer rifle after a fight with his son (TR. 185). Threats
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made by defendant against the life of deceased to
show state of mind are generally admissible, and
remoteness in time goes only to the weight. State v.
Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944).
As a rebuttal witness, the daughter of the defendant testifL"d that her father had gotten his gun
out of the car and was going to shoot the family cat
and dog. Again no objection was made by defense
counsel. This she testified, took place the afternoon
before the shooting. This threw a cloud of credibility on the statements by defendant.
This type of evidence is admissible. The theory
of the defendant is that there was self-def?nse in
this situation or that somehow the defendant was
committing an illegal act not amounting to a felony.
Evidence which shows that there was "bad blood"
between defendant and his son would inform the
jury as to whether or not there was self-defense.
Evidence which shows that the defendant contin·
ually weilded a loaded weapon whenever he was
angry, certainly informs the jury as to his state of
mind in this case. This evidence does have special
relevancy to prove the crime charged. It shows that
the defendant entertained malice towards his son.
The threats to others and to animals shows that the
defendant continually made assualts with a loaded
weapon which, being a felony under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953), would eliminate involuntary
manslaughter.
Furthermore, the reception of this evidence was
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not prejudicial to the defendant since he did not
object to some of it. In light of the abundance of
other evidence which connected him with the killing, it cannot be said that he suffered undue prejudice by the reception of this testimony. The Supreme Court must "give judgment without regard
to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Even if an error has been
committed, there is no presumption of prejudice.
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (1953).
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN AMPLE TO SUPPORT A JURY VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MUR-

DER.

In People v. Davis, 47 Cal. Rptr. 801, 408 P.2d 129
(1965), there was a conviction of second degree
murder. In that case self-defense was the defendant's theory, and he claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support such a conviction. The
Supreme Court of California held that the elements
"may be implied from the circumstances of the
homicide." The same is true in the case at bar.
To convict this defendant of second degree
murder the jury had to find that there was an unlawful killing with malice aforethought. "Malice,"
as applied to second degree murder, is the wish
to do great bodily harm. The following summary
of evidence (most favorable to the State) shows that
the jury came to the proper verdict-second degree
murder:
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1. Defendant kept a loaded gun (TR. 180).

2. Defendant got out a deer rifle after a figh!
with his son (TR. 185).

3. Defendant and his son had an argument
which defendant started (TR. 226).

4. Defendant went for his gun first (TR. 227).
5. Defendant yelled 'TH kill you" (TR. 136).
6. Defendant shot his gun in the ground or in
the air (TR. 136).

7. Defendant then saw his son with a gun and
he shot his son, at a distance of two or three
feet (TR. 223).
8. The defendant stated to the police that he
was too close to miss (TR. 222).

9. The defendant stated to the police that "he
had shot the boy and wasn't sorry" (TR. 99).

Admittedly the above summary of evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, bu!
it does show that there was ample evidence whers·
by the jury could find a verdict of second degree
murder. In light of some of the impeachment testi·
mony in this case, the jury found the proper verdict.
CONCLUSION
There were no errors committed by the trial
court which would warrant a new trial. The Miranda
warning was given and complied with. The court
was correct in refusing the instruction of involun·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

tary manslaughter. There was no error in allowing
the prosecution to admit evidence which showed
the defendant's state of mind. For the above stated
reasons this case must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent
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